It is often said that trends are cyclical, and football is no exception.
Ever since the first tactical system in football was created, it was destined that tactics would reach an endpoint one day because there are only so many positions on the field, and variations are finite.
In fact, the world Lu Yang is part of is nearing the end of its tactical evolution in football.
From the earliest form of football enlightenment to the emergence of the pyramid tactic, to the unbeatable WM formation, to the Hungarian center forward’s withdrawal leading to the birth of the false number nine position, to the emergence and perfection of defensive football, chain defense, and zonal marking in the 1960s, to the birth of the total football philosophy and 433 formation in the 1970s by the Netherlands, man-marking tactics, libero tactics, 442 formation, extreme possession play like tiki-taka, and Guardiola’s Manchester City.
For a long period, football theory didn’t produce anything fundamentally new; instead, head coaches used existing elements to create higher-level combinations and mosaics.
But with foundational elements being so limited, even combinations will eventually be exhausted.
Where will football tactics head next?
Actually, the era Lu Yang belongs to has already touched upon some of it.
That is dynamic tactics.
Of course, in this era, such concepts are still quite advanced; here, possession football has yet to fully rise.
Back to San Remo.
San Remo’s current problem is the absence of a midfield organizing core, making them almost incapable of developing any organized or non-counterattack offensive strategies.
And if the goal is merely to remain in the Italian Third Division, they could indeed employ defensive counterattack tactics, in which case San Remo wouldn’t be tactically troubled.
However, their goal this season is promotion, which requires them to play more aggressively; defensive counterattack cannot be their primary tactic.
Therefore, they must have an offensive core to break open the opponent’s defense.
If you look at the field as an upright rectangular nine-box grid, the second box and the eighth box represent both goals and the area directly in front of them.
These are always the most threatening positions.
In the statistics for Lewandowski’s shooting positions throughout 2020, ninety-two percent of his shots were concentrated in this area, namely close to the center and near the penalty box.
Thus, early football was straightforward: focus on these two positions, gain the advantage there to win the world.
And those closest to these positions are the attacking midfielder and the central forward.
However, the central forward is deep within the opponent’s blundering defenders, while the attacking midfielder positioned between the opponent’s defensive line and midfield line is the most threatening figure.
Indeed, the rise of the classical attacking midfielder followed this pattern.
But due to the emphasis on this area, subsequent teams developed excellent defensive coverage for this position, and attacking midfielders often face multi-player defensive encirclements and intense physical confrontations.
Most classical attacking midfielders are technically astute but not strong in physical confrontations.
In this context, the trend shifted toward having a deeper-seated team core.
When Maniero debuted, he played as an attacking midfielder then transitioned to a midfielder and eventually deep-lying midfielder.
Yet, as the era progressed, a decade later, the deeply seated organizing core became somewhat less viable.
On one hand, the pace of modern football has accelerated, causing deep-seated cores to miss many fleeting opportunities.
Simultaneously, while total football hasn’t dominated, the pressing tactics in the front brought about by it have posed survival risks for deep-seated cores.
Additionally, the overall improvement in player quality, as well as the pass-out abilities of center backs and tireless midfielders, have rendered deep-seated cores relatively redundant.
Finally, prolonged adaptation to the playing style of deeply seated cores has made most teams lose their fear and specific focus on the attacking midfielder position, resembling bygone times.
Thus, the style of having the core positioned further up began to present new possibilities.
Izalelt is a product of the era, a natural outcome, destined to drive Serie A’s tactical updates.
And Lu Yang is like a wave in the tides raised by Izalelt.
Of course, this wave may well grow to become a mightier force than the previous waves.
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At the San Remo Training Ground, a training match is underway.
This is San Remo’s closed training session prior to the second round of the Italian Cup.
Changing tactics on the eve of battle is very risky, even the renowned football head coach Gua Gualong Enlightening English Baldy has often suffered on this issue.
Fortunately, San Remo’s new tactic has little actual deviation from their original gameplay.
The real need to adapt mainly lies with their core, Lu Yang himself.
San Remo’s 4213 focuses mainly on the wings.
But unlike future demon wings, San Remo’s wings are typically clipped ones.
On the left, let’s not even mention Bai Zhami, it’s a black hole.
While the left-back is originally center-back Rondo and a substitute right-back.
The right side isn’t much better; perhaps more stable defensively, but right winger Fernandez equally struggles to take off.
Yet Sotu still chose this style of play because whether these wings can soar doesn’t really matter, because what truly decides victory is the team’s attacking midfielder position.
Choosing a wing playing style fundamentally aims to deliver football to the front the simplest way.
Without Morici, San Remo’s midfield isn’t merely lacking creativity; they can’t even organize effectively.
Forcing the midfield to handle the football instead would breed various issues.